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INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., a group 
of Houston, Texas homeowners filed a common-law nuisance suit to 
exclude an apartment building from their neighborhood.1  Plaintiffs 
argued that the apartment building would reduce their property 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, Touro Law Center.  Wesleyan University, B.A.; University of 
Pennsylvania, J.D.; University of Toronto, L.L.M.  A shorter article on related topics 
will appear at 43 REAL EST. L.J. 509 (2015). 
 1. See Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. (Tex. D. 
Ct. May 1, 2014), available at https://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/12/Ashby%20
opinion.pdf. 
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values by (among other things) increasing traffic and changing their 
neighborhood’s character.2  In December 2013, a jury awarded the 
plaintiffs damages, and the defendants plan to appeal the verdict.3  
The question of whether multi-family housing near single-family 
housing may constitute a nuisance is apparently one of first 
impression. 
If the Loughhead verdict is upheld on appeal, anti-development 
activists may seek to raise similar nuisance claims even in cities which 
have zoning codes,4 unlike Houston.5  If courts endorse such claims, 
apartment buildings throughout the United States could be found to 
constitute nuisances whenever litigious neighbors might object. 
Part I of this Article describes the background of nuisance law and 
the Loughhead litigation.  Part II then criticizes the arguments in 
favor of the plaintiffs’ claim.  Part III suggests that public policies in 
favor of walkable infill development and affordable housing support 
the rejection of similar claims, and adds that even if neighborhood 
concerns should be weighed against these policies, such balancing 
should occur during the zoning process, rather than through jury trials 
(at least in cities with zoning).  Part IV then proposes a rule that 
draws a line between appropriate and inappropriate nuisance actions. 
I.  FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF NUISANCE 
As noted above, the Loughhead plaintiffs alleged that the 
apartments at issue constituted a common-law nuisance because they 
would increase nearby traffic and otherwise harm neighborhood 
character.  This Part explains nuisance law, describes the relevant 
facts of Loughhead in more detail, and then discusses the most 
relevant case law. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Loughhead, No. 2013-2655, at 1; Erin Mulvaney, Jury Awards $1.7 Million 
to Residents in Ashby Case, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/
primeproperty/2013/12/jury-sides-with-residents-in-ashby-case/#18972101=0. 
 4. I note in passing that something permitted by zoning can still be an actionable 
nuisance. See 7 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 20.25 
(2011) (“A defendant’s compliance with a zoning ordinance may be a factor in 
determining whether the conduct is a nuisance, but it is not determinative.”).  Thus, 
nuisance actions may succeed even in cities with zoning, and even if the defendant’s 
conduct complies with zoning. 
 5. See Amanda Huron, Planning and Politics, in CITIES OF NORTH AMERICA: 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN U.S. AND CANADIAN CITIES 208 (Lisa Benton-
Short ed., 2013) (noting that Houston is the “only major city in the United States 
without zoning,” but adding that Houston has numerous other land-use regulations). 
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Nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of land.”6  Nuisance suits generally involve 
allegations that a defendant’s use of its land has caused unreasonable 
odor, pollution, or noise.7 
At common law, a nuisance exists whenever a person uses his land 
in a manner that causes substantial harm to another owner or 
possessor of land.8  As industrialization increased the number of 
polluting land uses, courts tried to accommodate industry by limiting 
nuisance claims to “unreasonable” land uses.9  Thus, petty 
annoyances (such as telephone calls10 or an ugly swimming pool11) 
may not constitute nuisances.12 
More recently, some courts have adopted a “balance of utilities 
test,” where a use is found to be “unreasonable unless the utility of 
the actor’s conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm.”13  For 
example, one Idaho decision adopted this balancing test on the 
ground that the state’s “economy depends largely upon the benefits 
of agriculture, lumber, mining and industrial development.”14  This 
statement suggests that in Idaho, nuisance claims against these 
industries will be met with skepticism, as the court will weigh any 
harm to nuisance plaintiffs against the economic benefits of such 
development. 
A. Factual Background of Loughhead 
In 2007, Buckhead Investment Partners began plans to build a 
mixed-use, twenty-three-story building on a tract of land that had 
previously been used for a two-story, sixty-seven-unit apartment 
                                                                                                                 
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
 7. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 20.10–.11 (devoting one section of 
nuisance discussion to noise pollution alone, and another to gases, smoke, dust, 
odors, vibration, and light pollution). 
 8. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 29.03 (2d ed. 
2007).  The discussion below relates to private nuisance claims, which involve land 
use that injures a private landowner. Id. § 29.01.  By contrast, public nuisance claims 
(attacking activity that interferes with the rights of the public generally) are beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Id. 
 9. Id. § 29.03. 
 10. See Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 508–09 (Mo. 1983) (holding that daytime 
telephone calls were not a nuisance, despite the fact that they awakened plaintiff). 
 11. See Fenton v. Longwill, No. 5836, 1987 WL 19559, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 
1987) (describing a pool as a “minor but distinct annoyance”). 
 12. SPRANKLING, supra note 8, § 29.04[D]. 
 13. Id. § 29.03. 
 14. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 228 (Idaho 1985). 
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complex.15  The land in question was near the Boulevard Oaks 
Historic District in Houston, Texas,16 a wealthy historic district with 
many single-family houses.17  Neighborhood residents vigorously 
opposed the project, primarily because of concerns about traffic.18  
Despite such neighborhood opposition, the city could not reject the 
project merely due to its alleged incompatibility with the surrounding 
neighborhood, because Houston has no zoning code to separate 
houses from multifamily dwellings.19 
Instead, the city’s Public Works Department denied the developers 
a permit to build a driveway on the ground that the project would 
create too much traffic.20  The developer then agreed to scale back the 
project by eliminating all of the project’s commercial uses and 
reducing the number of apartments in the building, among other 
things.21  The Public Works Department then granted the permit, but 
an appellate panel made up of city employees reversed that decision.22  
The developers filed suit, and the city settled the case by agreeing to 
grant the permit if the developers reduced the number of stories from 
twenty-three to twenty-one and made additional concessions to 
reduce traffic.23 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. 1, 11 (Tex. D. 
Ct. May 1, 2014) (describing developer’s plans; noting that a prior development had 
sixty-seven units; and pointing out that “[a] two story residential development was on 
the Property for decades”). 
 16. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition at ¶¶ 8–10, Loughhead v. Buckhead Inv. 
Partners, Inc., (Tex. D. Ct. May 1, 2013), http://stopashbyhighrise.org/site/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/1-Plaintiffs_Original_Petition.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].  
 17. See Historic Preservation Manual, CITY HOUS. PLANNING & DEV. DEP’T, 
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/HistoricPres/HistoricPreservationManual/historic
_districts/boulevard_oaks_arch.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (describing houses 
and their architectural styles); John Mixon, Four Land Use Vignettes From 
Unzoned(?) Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 166 (2010) 
(describing Boulevard Oaks and nearby Southampton as “wealthy” residential 
areas). 
 18. See Mixon, supra note 17, at 169 (“Yellow signs opposing the ‘Tower of 
Traffic’ sprouted on virtually every yard within a mile of the Ashby site.”).  In 
addition, some homeowners raised concerns over privacy and shadows from the high 
rise. Id. 
 19. Id. at 169. 
 20. Id. at 171. 
 21. Id. (describing developer’s decision to make property solely residential and to 
reduce the number of units); see Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 13-26155, 
slip op. 2–3 (Tex. D. Ct. May 1, 2014) (describing other measures to mitigate). 
 22. See Mixon, supra note 17, at 171. 
 23. See Caroline Evans, “This is Not Over”: Stop Ashby Organizers Vow 
Lawsuit, Picket Lines at Packed Strategy Meeting, EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 2012, http://
www.yourhoustonnews.com/bellaire/news/this-is-not-over-stop-ashby-organizers-
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A group of Boulevard Oaks homeowners responded by filing a 
nuisance suit against the developers in May 2013.24  The plaintiffs 
alleged, among other things, that the building would unreasonably 
interfere with their property because it would cause “[diversion of] 
traffic onto their small residential streets, and caus[e] substantial 
additional congestion at the intersections they use for ingress and 
egress.”25  In addition, they claimed that the building “would be 
abnormal and out of place in its surroundings thereby altering the 
character of the neighborhood [and] would substantially decrease the 
value of Plaintiffs’ houses.”26 
At a hearing held in June 2013, a trial court decided that the 
plaintiffs’ case could go to a jury based on Texas nuisance case law.27  
The trial commenced in November 2013, and ended with a jury 
verdict in December.28  The jury found a nuisance and awarded 
damages to the owners of twenty of the thirty nearby homes.29  The 
trial court rejected the defendants’ motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict,30 and the developers have appealed.31 
B. Legal Background: No Case Law on Point 
In 1926, the Supreme Court, in a decision upholding the 
constitutionality of zoning, wrote that apartments intermingled with a 
neighborhood of houses “come very near to being nuisances.”32  
                                                                                                                 
vow-lawsuit-picket/article_56b626dc-58fe-512b-903a-41854dcc2824.html (describing 
settlement). 
 24. See generally Complaint, supra note 16. 
 25. Id. ¶ 35.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the foundation of the high-rise would 
somehow damage the plaintiffs’ foundations, and that the height of the building 
would cause invasions of their privacy and reduced sunlight.  Id. 
 26. Id. ¶ 34. 
 27. See Hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Special Exceptions at 27, Loughhead 
v. Buckhead Inv. Partners, Inc., No. 13-26155 (Tex. D. Ct. June 6, 2013), http://stop
ashbyhighrise.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Transcript-06-06-13-Hearing-on-
Defs-Motion-for-Special-Exceptions.pdf (“I’m going to allow the plaintiff’s [sic] 
pleadings to stand . . . .  As I read the cases, I agree it appears there is no question but 
that I have [discretion to grant either an injunction or damages].”) 
 28. See Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., No. 2013-26155, slip op. at 3 (Tex. 
D. Ct. May 1, 2014). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 7.  The court did not explain in detail why it upheld the jury’s finding, 
stating only that the jury relied on unspecified evidence that the plaintiffs’ houses had 
lost market value. Id. at 17–18.  The court stated, “there is sufficient evidence to 
support that finding.” Id. at 7.  The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ request for an 
injunction rather than damages.  Id. at 7–11. 
 31. See Mulvaney, supra note 3. 
 32. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926). 
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However, the Court did not state that apartment buildings were 
nuisances, and in any event this statement was dicta because the 
decision addressed the constitutionality of zoning rather than a 
common law nuisance claim.33 
Since then, no case has directly addressed the question of whether 
a large apartment building near single-family homes is a nuisance.  
However, two nuisance cases involve a somewhat analogous situation: 
hotels and motels near single-family homes.  The Loughhead 
plaintiffs relied on Spiller v. Lyons.34  In Spiller, a group of 
homeowners alleged that a nearby motel would create a nuisance.35  
A Texas appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, 
partially because the motel violated restrictive covenants that 
burdened the defendant’s land,36 but also because “the increased 
traffic would be a danger to children walking to and from nearby 
schools . . . and the influx of strangers and transients would be an 
offense to normal sensibilities.”37  The court also stated, without any 
explanation, that “the present water and sewage services were already 
strained and that operation of a motel would further impair those 
services.”38 
Spiller is not directly on point for the issue at hand because the 
motel violated restrictive covenants.39  Moreover, the motel residents 
in Spiller would presumably have been more transient than the 
apartment residents in Loughhead.40  But some of the arguments 
raised by the Spiller court could apply to any apartments near an 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 394–95 (upholding zoning that excluded apartments from zones 
dominated by detached residences). 
 34. 737 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1987); see Hearing on Defendant’s Motion for 
Special Exceptions, supra note 27, at 9–10. 
 35. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  Plaintiffs also cited numerous other nuisance cases that did not involve 
housing or lodging. See Pool v. River Bend Ranch, 346 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App. 2011) 
(holding an all-terrain vehicle park a nuisance); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship 
v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding a cellular telephone tower a 
nuisance); Champion Forest Baptist Church v. Rowe, No. 01-86-654-CV, 1987 WL 
5188 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 1987) (upholding the trial court decision that church parking 
garage was a nuisance). 
 39. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30. 
 40. Compare Von der Heide v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal, 123 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (“[A motel] merely furnishes the transient guest with sleeping 
quarters and bath and toilet facilities, with linen service and a place to park his car.”) 
(emphasis added), with Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 92 N.Y.S. 851, 852 (N.Y. App. 
Term 1905) (“These apartments are rented upon annual leases and transient tenants 
are not solicited.”). 
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already-settled neighborhood, or indeed to any additional housing in 
such areas.  Nearly any new residential development will bring 
additional residents to a neighborhood, some of whom will be driving 
automobiles.41  Thus, the “increased traffic” argument raised by the 
Spiller court might make any new apartments (or even houses) a 
nuisance if they are near an existing neighborhood.  Since new 
residents of a neighborhood are by definition “strangers” at first, the 
court’s suggestion that “strangers and transients” create a nuisance 
might also justify a similar finding as to new housing.  And new 
residents may also increase the demand for infrastructure, as in the 
Spiller case.42 
On the other hand, at least one court has rejected a similar claim.  
In California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jenkins,43 the 
plaintiffs asserted that high-rise hotel-casinos near Lake Tahoe were a 
nuisance44 because they would attract “more people and cars”45 to the 
area, thus harming the regional environment.46  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, stating, “not every 
threatened injury can be enjoined as a potential nuisance.  The line is 
not a bright one, but we cannot consider high rise hotels and their 
occupants as indistinguishable from untreated sewage, noxious gases, 
and poisonous pesticides.”47  Thus, California Tahoe suggests that 
even hotels (and by implication houses and apartments) are so 
different from traditional nuisances that they should generally not be 
treated as such. 
A nuisance plaintiff might argue that the Spiller court’s decision 
that a motel near single-family houses was a nuisance supports a 
similar finding as to apartments, because hotels and motels, like 
apartments, involve temporary residents.  But nuisance case law 
involving hotels and motels is divided, and thus does not consistently 
support a nuisance claim directed against multifamily housing.  
Moreover, no case directly addresses whether new apartments near 
single-family housing are a nuisance. 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Cf. Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 
COUNCIL, http://www.nmhc.org/Content.aspx?id=4708 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
(noting that seventy-four percent of apartment renters’ households have at least one 
vehicle). 
 42. See Spiller, 737 S.W.2d at 30. 
 43. 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 44. Id. at 184. 
 45. Id. at 193. 
 46. Id. at 194. 
 47. Id. 
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II.  POLICY: ARGUMENTS FOR NUISANCE LIABILITY 
In the context of nuisance law, negative externalities are “land uses 
that have harmful spillover effects on neighboring property.”48  For 
example, when a business dirties the air or water without paying the 
costs of cleaning up such pollution, it has imposed an externality upon 
everyone negatively affected by such pollution.49  One purpose of 
nuisance law is to limit land uses that generate such externalities.50 
The Loughhead plaintiffs argued that placing large apartment 
buildings near single-family houses would create two major 
externalities: (1) increased traffic;51 and (2) intangibly altered 
neighborhood character and thus reduced property values.52  For the 
reasons stated below, courts should not use these arguments to justify 
limiting housing construction near existing development. 
A. Increased Traffic 
A common argument against new housing (raised not just in 
nuisance actions but in many zoning disputes)53 is that such housing 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Benjamin Harney, The Economics of Exclusionary Zoning and Affordable 
Housing, 38 STETSON L. REV. 459, 466 (2009).  More broadly, negative externalities 
are “costs imposed on a party by the actions of another party that are not borne by 
the acting party.” Richard D. Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of 
Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Planning: Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. 
VA. L. REV. 839, 843 (1993). 
 49. Gary & Teague, supra note 48, at 844. 
 50. See Harney, supra note 48, at 466–67 (“Nuisance disputes generally involve 
land uses that generate negative externalities . . . .”). 
 51. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 21. 
 52. Id. ¶ 34.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the building’s height would reduce 
their privacy and sunlight, that the project’s foundation would disrupt the soil of 
neighboring properties, and that by destroying nearby trees, the defendants would 
reduce neighborhood property values. Id. ¶¶ 27–28, 35.  Because these arguments are 
highly project-specific and would not necessarily apply to other multifamily 
development, I have chosen not to address them below.  It does seem to me, 
however, that as a general matter building height should not justify nuisance claims 
for two reasons.  First, it is simply not the case that high-rise buildings generally 
reduce sunlight, unless the building is on an extremely narrow street. See Michael 
Lewyn, The Sunlight Myth, PLANETIZEN (Apr. 29, 2014, 5:50 PM), http://
www.planetizen.com/node/68573 (showing numerous examples of tall buildings on 
sunny streets).  Second, a high-rise building will actually result in less visual intrusion 
into neighbors’ yards than a house or small apartment building, because just as the 
residents of a house 100 feet from a neighbor’s yard can see less than those of a house 
ten feet away, the residents of an apartment 100 feet above the yard can see less than 
those on lower floors. 
 53. See, e.g., Watson v. Mayflower Prop., 223 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1969) (upholding zoning limiting density, based on the city’s concerns about traffic 
congestion); Storch v. Zoning Bd. of Howard Cnty., 298 A.2d 8, 15 (Md. 1968) 
(same); Jeffrey L. Sparks, Land Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private 
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would increase traffic.  This argument can be used against any new 
housing, since any development would add people to a neighborhood 
and thus possibly add cars.  For example, residents of an existing 
subdivision might argue that if a new subdivision is created anywhere 
near them, the new residents would use the same roads as the current 
residents, creating additional traffic congestion. 
This argument should not justify a nuisance action for three 
reasons.  First, arguments based on traffic have no logical stopping 
point.  If any increase in population means increased traffic, and 
increased traffic means nuisance, then there is no reason why only 
homeowners could raise nuisance claims.  A commercial landowner 
or residential landlord could raise the same complaint, asserting that 
nearby housing could clog traffic and thus unreasonably interfere with 
the commutes of its employees, tenants, and customers.   
Second, if new people mean new traffic, this means that new 
housing will add traffic wherever it is located.  If new housing does 
not add traffic in the plaintiffs’ neighborhood, such housing will be 
built elsewhere and add traffic in someone else’s neighborhood.54  
Thus, the claim that traffic equals nuisance is a “beggar thy neighbor” 
argument—rather than eliminating the externality of traffic, it merely 
shifts the externality to another neighborhood and thus does not 
reduce society’s total of negative externalities.  Moreover, lawsuits 
designed to exclude new housing may not even limit traffic in the 
plaintiffs’ neighborhood: if restrictions on development keep people 
out of neighborhood A and force them to live in neighborhood B 
instead, neighborhood B’s cars may drive through neighborhood A, 
thus increasing congestion in both neighborhoods.55 
Third, to the extent that nuisance suits limit the density of existing 
neighborhoods and force new housing into “greenfield” sites—that is, 
undeveloped areas, as opposed to places near existing 
development56—they may actually increase region-wide automobile 
                                                                                                                 
Property Rights Protection Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 211, 232 (2009) (“Zoning that limits 
density may relate to transportation and traffic control.”). 
 54. Cf. Adam Millard-Ball, Phantom Trips, ACCESS MAG., Fall 2014, at 3, http://
www.accessmagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/01/access45-Phantom-
Trips-revise-links.pdf.  Highway engineers’ estimates of how many trips will be 
generated by new development are often erroneous because “most trips substitute 
for existing ones—they are diverted from existing locations as people change where 
they live, work, and shop in the light of new travel options.” Id. at 6. 
 55. Of course, this is most likely to be the case in certain circumstances: where 
neighborhood A has some destination worth visiting, or where drivers can cut 
through neighborhood A in order to reach some destination worth visiting. 
 56. See Anne Marie Pippin, Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield 
Redevelopment Makes Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in 
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traffic.  Greenfield sites tend to be more automobile-dependent than 
existing neighborhoods, because they are further from urban cores 
that are often the hub of public transit networks.57  Thus, shifting 
housing to greenfields would cause the overall amount of automobile 
traffic to increase, because some people who might not drive to every 
destination if they lived in an existing neighborhood would become 
full-time drivers in an automobile-dependent greenfield 
neighborhood.  And even if the number of drivers remained constant, 
vehicle miles traveled would increase if greenfield sites were further 
from shops and other destinations, thus forcing people into longer 
commutes.58 
In sum, the argument that added traffic is sufficient to make 
development a nuisance lacks merit.  If added neighborhood traffic 
makes development a nuisance, all new housing is a nuisance.  But if 
all new housing is a nuisance, a successful nuisance claim may merely 
displace the nuisance of traffic from a plaintiff’s neighborhood to 
another neighborhood. 
B. Neighborhood Character 
A nuisance plaintiff might argue that new housing, especially 
housing dissimilar to a neighborhood’s existing housing stock, is a 
nuisance because it is (in the words of the Loughhead complaint) 
“abnormal and out of place in its surroundings,”59 which might, in 
some intangible way, make the neighborhood less popular and thus 
reduce property values.60  This argument, like arguments based on 
                                                                                                                 
the United States and Central and Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 
596 (2009) (defining greenfields as “pristine, undeveloped land typically located in 
low density suburban areas”); Andrea Wortzel, Greening the Inner Cities: Can 
Federal Tax Incentives Solve the Brownfields Problem?, 29 URB. LAW. 309, 315 
(1997) (defining greenfields as “undeveloped sites in suburban or rural locations”). 
 57. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 58. I note that this seems to be the case; neighborhoods far from downtown, in 
fact, tend to be further from shops and similar destinations, while downtowns and 
nearby areas tend to be within walking distance of more destinations. See, e.g., Jack 
Romig, Walk This Way: Close-to-Home Amenities Prove Draw as More People 
Leave Their Cars Parked, MORNING CALL (Jan. 3, 2014), http://articles.mcall.com/
2014-01-03/features/mc-walkability-sunday-real-estate--0105-20140103_1_walkability-
easton-main-street-initiative-valley-community (citing examples); Boise, Idaho, 
WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/ID/Boise_City (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
(illustrating that neighborhoods near downtown are more walkable); Hamilton, 
Ontario, WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/CA-ON/Hamilton (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2015) (same); Richmond, Virginia, WALKSCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/
VA/Richmond (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (same). 
 59. Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 34. 
 60. Id. 
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traffic congestion, has no logical stopping point: any new housing 
changes neighborhood character to some extent, and any new housing 
might also affect property values by increasing citywide housing 
supply. 
Like congestion-related arguments against new housing, the 
“neighborhood character” argument is essentially another “beggar 
thy neighbor” argument: if additional density affects neighborhood 
character, it will change the character of a greenfield site just as much 
as it changes the character of an existing neighborhood.  Indeed, the 
effect of new housing upon greenfield sites will be more radical: a 
large apartment building will change a cornfield far more drastically 
than it will change a neighborhood full of houses or small apartment 
buildings.  Thus, restrictions upon new housing may merely shift out-
of-character development from one site to another. 
Even if the threat of nuisance suits causes new housing to shift to 
an area with a similar housing stock rather than to a greenfield site, 
the new housing affects the “receiving” area’s character by increasing 
neighborhood population.  For example, a neighborhood with ten 
apartment buildings will presumably feel busier than a neighborhood 
with just five apartment buildings, even if no other housing exists. 
Moreover, the public policy in favor of reducing pollution actually 
supports changing the character of some areas.  In recent decades, 
many suburbs and neighborhoods have been built in a way that forces 
their residents to drive automobiles in order to reach any conceivable 
destination.61  These automobile-dependent neighborhoods generate 
both greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of automobile-
induced pollution.62  Because pollution has traditionally been a major 
concern in nuisance law,63 preserving these places in their current 
automobile-dependent form is likely to create nuisance-like harms, 
rather than prevent them.  By contrast, if infill development changes 
neighborhood character by adding housing that is close enough to 
public transit stations and bus stops to increase transit ridership, or is 
close enough to shops and offices to enable people to walk to these 
places, such development actually mitigates the nuisance-like harms 
caused by low-density development.64 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See infra notes 83–96 and accompanying text (contrasting older, more 
pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods with newer areas). 
 62. See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text (explaining that less 
automobile-dependent places create less pollution). 
 63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 64. I note, however, that this argument is not applicable to all infill development: 
some infill development does little to increase walkability or access to public transit, 
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A nuisance plaintiff’s emphasis on property values should also not 
be indulged, because many American communities have been too 
successful in bolstering land prices.  For example, in San Francisco, 
zoning is quite restrictive,65 and residential development is so difficult 
that the city has added only 1500 housing units per year for the past 
twenty years—fewer than the city’s population gain (32,000 people) 
from 2010 to 2013 alone.66  The law of supply and demand suggests 
that where a city has artificially constricted supply, housing prices will 
be high.67  This is in fact the case in San Francisco.  Housing prices in 
San Francisco are quite high; the average housing unit costs over 
$800,000, more than ten times median household income.68 
Out-of-control housing costs caused by constricted housing supply 
are not limited to large cities such as San Francisco.  For example, 
Sausalito, California, a suburb of San Francisco,69 granted between 1.4 
and 13.6 permits per 10,000 people yearly since 2000.70  By contrast, 
the state average has ranged between 6.4 and 45.3 building permits 
per 10,000 people.71  As a result, Sausalito’s median housing unit costs 
over $900,000, more than three times the state average ($283,000 in 
2012).72 
Some commentators argue that homeowners have relied on the 
neighborhood status quo, and thus should have veto power over new 
development.  For example, Bradley Karkkainen argues that when 
someone buys a house, he or she intends to purchase not only the 
property, but part of the “neighborhood commons”73—not only 
                                                                                                                 
either because it is not located near shopping or public transit, or because it is 
designed in a way that discourages walking (for example, a subdivision without 
sidewalks or with overly wide streets). 
 65. See Kim-Mai Cutler, How Burrowing Owls Lead to Vomiting Anarchists (or 
SF’s Housing Crisis Explained), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 14, 2014), http://tech
crunch.com/2014/04/14/sf-housing/ (describing zoning and planning process in San 
Francisco, and how it limits housing supply). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See San Francisco, California, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/
city/San-Francisco-California.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
 69. See Sausalito, California, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/
Sausalito-California.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).  Sausalito is a town 7.4 miles 
from San Francisco. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  In 2012, the estimated median house or condo value was $928,705. Id.  The 
mean price of a detached house was $1,100,950. Id. 
 73. Bradley Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45, 69 (1994).  Although Karkkainen makes this argument in the context of 
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community-owned property “such as public schools, public 
recreational facilities, and public transportation facilities,”74 but also 
“intangible qualities such as neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics, and 
the physical environment.”75 
According to Karkkainen, changes in a neighborhood’s density or 
land use,76 by changing the physical environment, reduce the value of 
neighbors’ interest in the “commons” because “the neighborhood is 
taking the first step toward becoming something other than the 
neighborhood where [the residents] chose to live.”77  In other words, 
neighborhood residents purchase homes in reliance on neighborhood 
pattern X, and therefore should have veto power over changes that 
turn neighborhood X into someplace different. 
But this argument may be a self-fulfilling prophecy; when judges 
and politicians give people the right to veto nearby development, they 
are more likely to expect the status quo to remain, and thus more 
likely to rely on it.  Homeowners already have this veto power 
through zoning codes, since zoning boards and politicians often take 
the advice of neighborhood activists.78  Extending this veto power to 
nuisance actions would, if anything, increase such reliance.  
Accordingly, courts should reject this argument. 
In sum, courts should reject nuisance plaintiffs’ arguments that any 
new housing that might affect neighborhood character or property 
values should justify liability, because this argument is a “beggar thy 
neighbor” argument: if development is kept out of a neighborhood, it 
shifts to another area and changes the character of that place.  
Moreover, the public interest favors more housing rather than less, 
especially in expensive regions where limited housing supply has 
made housing overwhelmingly expensive. 
                                                                                                                 
zoning, it seems to me that this argument could also be used to justify nuisance 
actions. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 73 (stating that “changes in density, as well as shifts from residential to 
commercial or industrial uses” are “disruptive of a neighborhood’s character because 
they are inconsistent with current uses of the neighborhood commons”). 
 77. Id. at 72–73. 
 78. See Greg Greenway, Getting the Green Light for Senate Bill 375: Public 
Engagement for Climate-Friendly Land Use in California, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
433, 442 (2010) (arguing that infill development is not as common as professional 
planners would like because when one landowner proposes such development, other 
neighborhood “residents frequently organize to oppose such development”); 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, 62 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 84–85 (2012). 
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III.  POLICY: ARGUMENTS AGAINST NUISANCE LIABILITY 
To the extent that concerns over property values, neighborhood 
character, and increased traffic justify nuisance claims related to new 
housing, these concerns are outweighed by three major policies: (1) 
the public policy in favor of pedestrian-friendly “infill” development, 
(2) the public policy in favor of affordable rental housing, and (3) the 
public policy in favor of orderly zoning and planning. 
A. Infill Development, Walkability, and Transit 
Because most urban land is zoned for single-family housing, 
virtually all of urban America (except in the most densely populated 
cities) is near a group of single-family houses such as those owned by 
the Loughhead plaintiffs.  In Houston, single-family housing takes up 
sixty-seven percent of all land and ninety-five percent of all land used 
for housing.79  One survey of ten cities shows that Houston is only the 
sixth most house-dominated city out of those ten surveyed; even in 
Baltimore (the least house-dominated city surveyed), forty-nine 
percent of all land and seventy percent of residential land is used for 
houses.80  Even a brief look at Baltimore streets will reveal that multi-
family and commercial land is often concentrated on a few major 
streets, and that those streets are surrounded by streets full of single-
family homes.81  It logically follows that if apartments near single-
family homes were a nuisance, almost every new apartment building 
in the United States would be a nuisance.  If apartments could be 
built at all, they could only be built in “greenfield” locations—that is, 
in exurban places far from existing development. 
But public policy favors building housing in existing urban 
neighborhoods and inner suburbs, rather than in greenfields, for two 
reasons.  First, because existing neighborhoods tend to be more 
pedestrian-friendly than greenfield sites, development in existing 
neighborhoods (commonly referred to as “infill”)82 increases the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See GORDON BONAN, ECOLOGICAL CLIMATOLOGY, ch. 14, at 24 (2002), 
available at http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/tss/aboutus/staff/bonan/ecoclim/1sted/Chapter
14.pdf (reporting that sixty-seven percent of city land was used by single-family 
homes, three percent by multifamily housing, and thirty percent by commercial and 
industrial space). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See generally GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com.  To see individual 
streets look at Baltimore, Md. and click on the “Street View” icon. 
 82. Cf. Morgan E. Rog, Highway to the Danger Zone: Urban Sprawl, Land Use, 
and the Environment, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 717 (2010) (contrasting 
infill development with “outward expansion” of cities). 
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number of people who can walk to jobs, shops, and other 
destinations.  Second, because existing neighborhoods are more likely 
to be well served by public transit than greenfield sites, infill increases 
the number of people who can use public transit rather than driving.  
In turn, increased walking and transit use creates a variety of public 
benefits: people living in walkable, transit-oriented infill 
neighborhoods benefit because they can get more exercise and spend 
less money on automobile-related costs, and the public as a whole 
benefits from reduced automobile-related pollution. 
1. Walkability and Infill 
For a variety of reasons explained below,83 older, more urban areas 
tend to be more walkable (that is, more comfortable for pedestrians) 
than greenfield sites.  Such walkable places create a variety of 
benefits both for their residents and for the public as a whole, 
including reduced obesity, reduced transportation costs, reduced 
pollution, and reduced harm from car crashes. 
a. Why Infill Is Usually More Walkable 
Older neighborhoods (especially those built before automobile 
ownership became nearly universal) are more likely than greenfield 
sites to be designed around the needs of the pedestrian,84 rather than 
being designed solely for the benefit of motorists.  For example, older 
neighborhoods are more likely to have sidewalks, thus allowing 
pedestrians to walk without having to dodge speeding traffic 
throughout their walk.85  Furthermore, older neighborhoods also tend 
to have narrower streets.86  Narrow streets are more convenient for 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See infra Part III.A.1.a. 
 84. I do not discuss bicyclists separately because many of the points below apply 
to bicyclists as well.  For example, if a speeding motorist on a wide street is less likely 
to notice a pedestrian in time to avoid an accident, such a motorist is less likely to 
notice a bicyclist as well. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Robert Puentes, First Suburbs in the Northeast and Midwest: Assets, 
Challenges, and Opportunities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1469, 1471 (2002) (noting that 
older suburbs were “built when sidewalks were the rule, not the exception”); Gabor 
Zovanyi, The Role of Initial Smart-Growth Legislation in Advancing the Tenets of 
Smart Growth, 39 URB. LAW. 371, 383 (2007) (“[W]ritings that list common features 
of older neighborhoods refer to . . . streets lined with trees and sidewalks.”). 
 86. See John M. Barry, Form-Based Codes: Measured Success Through Both 
Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 307 (2008) 
(pointing out that “narrow streets” are one of several “central features of older cities 
that have largely disappeared”); Zovanyi, supra note 85, at 383 (noting that “narrow 
streets” are a common feature of older areas). 
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pedestrians because they take less time to cross than wider streets.87  
In addition, narrower streets are safer for pedestrians than are wide 
streets, because the more time a pedestrian spends on a street, the 
more time he or she is exposed to vehicle traffic.88  Wide streets also 
tend to encourage motorists to drive more rapidly,89 thus increasing 
the likelihood of pedestrian/automobile collisions.  A speeding 
motorist has a narrower field of vision than one driving slowly, and is 
thus less likely to notice a pedestrian.90  Moreover, a speeding 
motorist who does notice a pedestrian is less likely to be able to stop 
in time to avoid a collision than a motorist who is driving more 
slowly.91  And when collisions do occur, they are more likely to be 
fatal at rapid speeds: a non-motorist has a 3.5% chance of death from 
a car traveling fifteen miles per hour, and an 83% chance of death 
from a vehicle traveling forty-four miles per hour.92 
Older neighborhoods also tend to have shorter blocks than newer 
areas.93  Where blocks are shorter and intersections more common, 
pedestrians have more opportunities to cross streets without crossing 
midblock or going out of their way to reach an intersection, and thus 
can reach destinations more quickly.94 
The oldest, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods are also more likely 
to have streets that are arranged in an interconnected grid, rather 
than the cul-de-sac, dead-end streets that dominate most late 
twentieth-century suburbs.95  A grid system is more comfortable for 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See Donavan v. Jones, 658 So. 2d 755, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 88. See Wallace Immen, City Seeks Solution to Commute Crunch, GLOBE & 
MAIL, Apr. 26, 2002, at A22 (pointing out that in downtown Toronto, pedestrians 
“have to run to beat the changing light” on wide streets). 
 89. See Stephen H. Burrington, Restoring the Rule of Law and Respect for 
Communities in Transportation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 691, 700 (1996) (arguing that 
“solicitude toward fast traffic” motivates government to build wide streets). 
 90. Id. at 704 n.50 (noting that a motorist driving thirty miles per hour has a 150-
degree field of vision, while one driving twice that speed has only a fifty-degree field 
of vision). 
 91. See Joey Ledford, Speeding Cars Terrify Neighborhoods, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Aug. 27, 1997, at B (“At 20 mph, it takes you 20 feet to react and another 20 
feet to stop.  At 40 mph, it’s 40 feet to think and another 80 feet to stop.”). 
 92. See Burrington, supra note 89, at 704. 
 93. See Barry, supra note 86, at 307 (describing “short blocks” as another “central 
feature of older cities”). 
 94. See Jeff Gray, Police Blaming Accident Victims, Pedestrian Says, GLOBE & 
MAIL, Mar. 15, 2004, at A8 (stating that suburban Toronto is “trouble for 
pedestrians” because of “long blocks that provide so few safe opportunities [for 
pedestrians to cross streets]”). 
 95. See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented 
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and 
Urban Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 556 (1998). 
2015] YES TO INFILL 857 
pedestrians because where residential cul-de-sacs do not connect with 
other cul-de-sacs, pedestrians must go out of their way to travel from 
one residential street to another.96 
In theory, a greenfield building or subdivision could be remade to 
resemble older city neighborhoods, with sidewalks and a grid of short, 
narrow streets.  But, such a neighborhood might be very automobile-
dependent if its residents had no worthwhile destinations within 
walking distance.  Because this is often the case for greenfield sites far 
from regional downtowns, places near built-out urban cores are, as a 
practical matter, the most walkable.97 
Admittedly, a few developers of greenfield sites have solved this 
problem by building not just residences on pedestrian-oriented 
streets, but shops and offices near the residences.98  But, such large-
scale greenfield development requires a considerable amount of 
capital, because the developer must either build hundreds of 
residences to create demand for the nearby shops,99 or be lucky 
enough to find a site that is accessible to residents of other 
neighborhoods.100  However, any site that is close enough to nearby 
neighborhoods to attract customers may be close enough to attract a 
nuisance action.  So, if courts hold that new housing creates a 
nuisance merely by its proximity to an existing neighborhood, the 
most walkable neighborhoods are likely to be nuisances even if they 
are on greenfield sites. 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Michael Southworth & Eran Ben-Joseph, Reconsidering the Cul-de-Sac, 
ACCESS MAG., Spring 2004, at 28, 29–30 (explaining that a pedestrian “must always 
leave the cul-de-sac via a collector street to go anywhere” and showing a diagram of a 
cul-de-sac in which pedestrians cannot reach parallel streets). 
 97. See supra note 58. 
 98. See, e.g., LANCE JAY BROWN ET AL., URBAN DESIGN FOR AN URBAN 
CENTURY: SHAPING MORE LIVABLE, EQUITABLE, AND RESILIENT CITIES 155 (2d ed. 
2014) (describing Kentlands in suburban Washington as a “greenfield suburban 
development” that was designed “along the lines of a traditional urban neighborhood 
[because among other things, it] substituted a street grid for conventional cul-de-
sacs”); AARON PASSELL, BUILDING THE NEW URBANISM: PLACES, PROFESSIONS, AND 
PROFITS IN THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE 7–8 (2012) (describing a mix 
of uses in Kentlands). 
 99. See Hazel Borys, Retail On My Mind, PLACEMAKERS (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:01 
AM) http://www.placemakers.com/2012/02/20/retail-on-my-mind/ (referring to the 
common rule of thumb that one thousand housing units is usually necessary to 
support a neighborhood corner store, unless it can attract visitors from outside 
neighborhoods). 
 100. Id. (stating the “1000 rooftop” rule is less likely to be relevant if a store “is 
located along a busy road, or if there is an employment center or civic use nearby that 
attracts shoppers beyond the neighborhood”). 
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b. Why the Public Interest Favors Walkability 
When infill development increases the number of people who can 
walk to various destinations, the public benefits in several respects. 
First, people who live in walkable communities are likely to be 
healthier, because someone who has more opportunity to walk is, all 
else being equal, more likely to engage in physical activity and thus 
less likely to be overweight or obese.101  The U.S. Surgeon General 
advises that thirty minutes of walking for five days a week will reduce 
the risks of obesity and weight related problems102—a goal more likely 
to be met in areas that are comfortable for pedestrians.  For example, 
one Australian study found that after controlling for socio-economic 
factors such as income and education, “individuals living in high 
compared to less walkable areas were not as likely to be obese.”103  
Similarly, a survey of New York City residents asked a sample of New 
Yorkers how frequently they walked or cycled ten blocks or more, 
and found that as walkability increased, so did the likelihood of such 
exercise.104 
Second, people drive less where they have the opportunity to 
walk—and where people drive less, they are, all else being equal, 
more prosperous because they spend less on transportation.  For 
example, residents of Portland, Oregon, drive twenty percent less 
than residents of the average metropolitan area, and thus collectively 
save $1.1 billion per year.105  Similarly, residents of the city of 
Washington, D.C., spend $9461 per household on transportation 
annually, while the average household in Washington’s outer suburbs 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Vanessa Russell-Evans & Carl S. Hacker, Expanding Waistlines and 
Expanding Cities: Urban Sprawl and its Impact on Obesity, How the Adoption of 
Smart Growth Statutes Can Help Build Healthier and More Active Communities, 29 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 75–88 (2011) (summarizing evidence); Reid Ewing et. al., 
Relationship Between Urban Sprawl and Physical Activity, Obesity and Morbidity — 
Update and Refinement, 26 HEALTH & PLACE 118 (2014). 
 102. See MEGAN LEHMAN ET AL., INST. FOR PUB. ADMIN., HEALTHY & WALKABLE 
COMMUNITIES 3 (2007), http://www.ipa.udel.edu/publications/HealthyWalkable.pdf. 
 103. See Falk Müller-Riemenschneider et al., Neighborhood Walkability and 
Cardiometabolic Risk Factors in Australian Adults: An Observational Study, 13 
BMC PUB. HEALTH 755 (2013), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2458/13/755. 
 104. See Lance Freeman et al., Neighborhood Walkability and Active Travel 
(Walking and Cycling) in New York City, 90(4) J. URB. HEALTH 575, 580 (2013), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3732693/pdf/11524_2012_
Article_9758.pdf (finding “inverse association between [neighborhood] walkability 
and reporting no episodes of active travel”). 
 105. See JEFF SPECK, WALKABLE CITY: HOW DOWNTOWN CAN SAVE AMERICA 
ONE STEP AT A TIME 29 (2012). 
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spends $15,601 per household, and some suburbs have even higher 
transportation costs.106 
Third, if more Americans are allowed to live in neighborhoods 
where they can reach a wide variety of destinations without driving, 
they will create less automobile-related pollution than would 
otherwise be the case.  According to one study, sponsored by the 
Urban Land Institute, more compact, walkable development could 
reduce vehicle miles traveled by twenty to forty percent, which in turn 
would reduce total transportation-related carbon dioxide emissions 
by seven to ten percent by 2050.107 
Environmental benefits from walkable development are not 
limited to greenhouse gases.  One study by several scholars, sought to 
quantify the benefits of reduced driving by replacing half of all short 
car trips in the eleven largest Midwestern regions with bicycle trips, 
thus reducing regional vehicle miles by ten percent.108  The study 
found that reducing short car trips would reduce particulate matter109 
pollution enough to lead to 525 fewer pollution-related deaths and 
thousands of fewer hospital admissions, thus creating a societal 
savings of just over $4.2 billion per year.110 
Fourth, walkable communities tend to be safer, because where 
people can drive less frequently, they are less likely to injure 
themselves and others with their vehicles.  The automobile-oriented 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See URBAN LAND INST., BELTWAY BURDEN: THE COMBINED COST OF 
HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE GREATER WASHINGTON, DC, 
METROPOLITAN AREA 4–5 (2009), available at http://commerce.uli.org/misc/Beltway
Burden.pdf (listing costs for various jurisdictions, and adding that the most expensive 
suburb is Fauquier County, Virginia, where an average transportation cost of $17,996 
makes the combined cost of housing and transportation more than twenty-five 
percent more than the region’s central jurisdictions); cf. URBAN LAND INST., BAY 
AREA BURDEN 6–7 (2009), available at http://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
Bay-Area-Burden-1026-LowRes2.pdf (showing similar results for metropolitan San 
Francisco cities and suburbs, despite the region’s higher housing costs). 
 107. REID EWING ET AL., URBAN LAND INST., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE 
ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/growingcoolerCH1.pdf. 
 108. See Maggie L. Grabow et al., Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health 
Benefits from Reduced Car Travel in the Midwestern United States, 120 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 68, (Jan. 2012) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3261937/. 
 109. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that particulate matter “refers to all solid particles and liquid droplets 
found in air” and is “associated with a range of adverse health effects such as 
coughing, shortness of breath, aggravation of existing respiratory conditions like 
asthma and chronic bronchitis, increased susceptibility to respiratory infections and 
heightened risk of premature death”). 
 110. See Grabow et al., supra note 108, at 72–73. 
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United States has traffic fatality rates far higher than those of 
European nations with less automobile dependence, and within the 
United States the most automobile-oriented places have the highest 
automobile fatality rates.111  The seven metropolitan areas with the 
highest share of commuters walking to work were New York, Boston, 
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Washington; in 
these regions, between 3.5% and 5.9% of commuters walked to 
work.112  Six of the seven (all but Pittsburgh) had motor vehicle crash 
death rates below the average for metropolitan areas, and even 
Pittsburgh’s death rate was below the average for the United States as 
a whole.113  By contrast, the metropolitan areas with the lowest 
percentage of pedestrian commuters were Birmingham, Dallas, 
Nashville, Orlando, Raleigh, and Richmond, with Atlanta and 
Louisville tied for seventh; in these regions, between 1% and 1.3% of 
commuters walked to work.114  All seven had traffic death rates higher 
than that of Pittsburgh (and thus of the average metropolitan area).115 
Residents of walkable communities create a wide variety of 
benefits for themselves and for the public, including exercise-related 
health benefits, reduced spending on transportation, reduced 
pollution, and fewer deaths and injuries from car crashes.  It follows 
that if nuisance suits are allowed to reduce the amount of infill 
development, and if such development would otherwise often occur 
in walkable areas, Americans will exercise less, spend more on 
transportation, pollute more, and be more likely to die in car crashes. 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See SPECK, supra note 105, at 45. 
 112. See Wendell Cox, Major Metropolitan Commuting Trends: 2000–2010, NEW 
GEOGRAPHY (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.newgeography.com/content/002500-major-
metropolitan-commuting-trends-2000-2010.  I am not counting Rochester, New York, 
(which actually ranked ahead of two of these cities) because I have not found its 
traffic death statistics. 
 113. See Scott R. Kegler et al., Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths in Metropolitan 
Areas—United States, 2009, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 20, 2012, at 
523, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6128.pdf.  The metropolitan 
area average was 8.2 deaths per 100,000 people, and the national average was 11.1 
deaths per 100,000 people. Id. at 524.  Death rates per 100,000 people for each 
metropolitan area were as follows: Boston 5.0, New York 5.1, Philadelphia 7.3, 
Pittsburgh 9.2, San Francisco 5.6, Seattle 5.9, and Washington 7.5. Id. at 524–26 
 114. See Cox, supra note 112. 
 115. See Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (reporting the following fatality 
rates per 100,000 people: Atlanta 10.7, Birmingham 15.3, Dallas 9.8, Louisville 11.8, 
Nashville 13.0, Orlando 11.3, Raleigh 9.6, and Richmond 11.5). 
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2. Infill and Transit 
Just as infill development increases walking, such development also 
increases public transit use, creating the same kinds of public benefits 
that are created by walkable neighborhoods. 
a. More Infill Means More Transit 
There are two reasons why residents of older areas can typically 
use public transit more easily than residents of greenfield sites.  First, 
transit networks have historically been centered near downtown 
business districts,116 so neighborhoods near downtowns (which tend to 
be older)117 tend to have the most convenient transit service and the 
highest transit ridership.118  Second, compact areas tend to have 
higher transit ridership than thinly populated places; if only a few 
houses can be built on a block near public transit, only a few houses 
can access such transit.119  Neighborhoods near downtown tend to be 
more compact, and thus can support more transit service.120 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF POST-
URBAN AMERICA 10 (2006) (explaining that, historically, transit lines converged 
downtown, and as the number of automobiles increased, “the prospects for 
downtown-centered public transit worsened”). 
 117. See, e.g., Bill Lewis, Infill Construction Boosts Older Neighborhoods, 
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.tennessean.com/story/money/real-estate/
2014/09/25/infill-construction-boosts-older-neighborhoods/16215821/ (identifying 
Nashville’s “older neighborhoods” with the “heart of the city”). 
 118. See Brian D. Taylor & Camille N.Y. Fink, The Factors Influencing Transit 
Ridership: A Review and Analysis of the Ridership Literature 7–8, 10 (UCLA Dep’t 
of Urban Planning, Working Paper 2003), available at http://www.uctc.net/papers/
681.pdf (citing studies showing that downtown district “employment explains a very 
high percentage . . . of the number of transit commuters,” and that the size of 
downtown districts is one factor affecting ridership). 
 119. See ANTHONY DOWNS, STILL STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK HOUR 
TRAFFIC 210 (2004) (noting that seven housing units per acre supports bus service 
once every half-hour); JED KOLKO, MAKING THE MOST OF TRANSIT: DENSITY, 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, AND RIDERSHIP AROUND NEW STATIONS 16 (2011), 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211JKR.pdf (“[T]ransit 
ridership falls considerably at distances beyond just one quarter-mile from a transit 
station.”); Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the California Environmental 
Quality Act with the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 
80 n.44 (2009) (explaining that raising average density to nine units per acre could 
reduce vehicle miles traveled by thirty percent nationwide); John Keitz, Public 
Transit: All About Density, NUMBERS BOX (Nov. 9 2014, 3:00 PM), http://numbers
box.blogspot.com/2014/11/public-transit-all-about-density.html. (showing that metro 
areas with the highest population density tend to have the highest transit ridership). 
 120. See KOLKO, supra note 119, at 8 (“[T]he density of both population and 
employment typically declines with increasing distance from downtown.”). 
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It follows that if new housing is built in existing neighborhoods 
(especially compact neighborhoods near regional downtowns), the 
residents of such housing will be able to walk, bike, and use public 
transit more frequently than would be the case if new housing were 
confined to greenfield sites. 
b. Housing Near Transit Benefits the Public 
The public benefits from increased housing supply near public 
transit for the same reasons that the public benefits from increased 
housing supply in walkable neighborhoods generally. 
For example, just as residents of walkable neighborhoods are more 
likely to be able to exercise in the course of their daily routine and 
thus to experience better health, residents of neighborhoods near 
public transit can do the same.  According to a federal household 
travel survey, users of transit spent a median of nineteen minutes 
walking to and from transit stops.121  Thus, many transit users may be 
able to meet (or almost meet) the Surgeon General’s 
recommendations even without other exercise. 
Similarly, just as the residents of walkable areas benefit financially 
by being able to spend less money on automobiles, people who live 
near public transit will also be able to drive less and thus spend less 
on automobiles.  As noted above, residents of central cities, which 
tend to have higher transit use than suburbs,122 tend to spend less on 
transportation than residents of automobile-dependent suburbs.123 
And just as residents of pedestrian-oriented neighborhoods pollute 
less, residents of transit-oriented places drive less and thus pollute 
less.  Harvard economist Edward Glaeser and University of 
California, Los Angeles economist Matthew Kahn conducted a study 
finding that the most transit-oriented places emitted fewer 
greenhouse gases than most automobile-dependent places.  In 
particular, New York City, the region with the highest use of public 
transit, had the lowest level of automobile-related carbon dioxide 
emissions from driving among sixty-six regions surveyed.124  The four 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Freeman et al., supra note 104, at 582. 
 122. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14238, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14238.pdf. 
 123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra note 122, at 42.  Even when public transit-related 
carbon dioxide emissions are added to this figure, New York’s per-household 
emissions level of 24,467 was below the national median for driving-related emissions 
alone (26,744). Id. 
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other regions where over ten percent of commuters used public 
transit (Washington, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco-Oakland)125 
had emissions levels higher than those of New York, but lower than 
the national median.126  By contrast, among the six regions surveyed 
where one percent or fewer of commuters used public transit, all had 
automobile-related carbon dioxide emissions higher than the national 
median.127  Moreover, cities (where transit usage tends to be higher)128 
consistently created less carbon dioxide than suburbs: in each of the 
sixty-six cities surveyed, transportation-related carbon dioxide 
emissions (including both emissions from automobiles and emissions 
from transit) were higher in suburbs than in cities.  For example, in 
New York, the city’s per-household transportation emissions were 
3783 pounds fewer than those of the suburbs.129 
Finally, residents of transit-friendly places, like residents of 
pedestrian-friendly places, also experience fewer deaths from car 
crashes than residents of automobile-dependent areas.  In the six 
regions where transit use is highest, car crash deaths were below the 
metropolitan area average.130  By contrast, in the seven regions where 
transit use is lowest, crash death rates were either higher than or (in 
the case of Indianapolis) equal to the metropolitan area average.131 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See Cox, supra note 112. 
 126. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra note 122, at 41.  The most-polluting region of the 
five, Washington, emitted 25,918 pounds of automobile-related carbon dioxide per 
household; twenty-eight of the sixty-six metropolitan areas created less pollution. Id. 
 127. See id.  The lowest-emission city of this group, Memphis, produced more 
automobile-related emissions (28,440 pounds of carbon dioxide per household) than 
all but sixteen of the sixty-six cities surveyed. Id.  The other five regions were Raleigh 
(29,922), Indianapolis (29,222), Birmingham (30,041), Nashville (30,495), and 
Oklahoma City (28,953). Id.  Glaeser and Kahn did not include statistics for 
Jacksonville, a seventh major metropolitan area where only 1 percent of commuters 
used transit to get to work. See Cox, supra note 112. 
 128. In every single region surveyed by Glaeser and Khan, public transit produced 
more carbon dioxide emissions in cities than in suburbs. See Glaeser & Kahn, supra 
note 122, at 41–44.  But in not one of those regions did the increased transit emissions 
from cities equal the increased vehicle emissions from suburbs. See id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. These regions are New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco-
Oakland, and Washington. See Cox, supra note 112.  For vehicle fatality statistics, see 
Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (providing statistics for each city except 
Boston).  Chicago’s regional death rate of 5.9 per 100,000 is below the metropolitan 
area average of 8.2. See id. 
 131. These regions are Birmingham, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Memphis, 
Nashville, Raleigh, and Oklahoma City. See Cox, supra note 112.  For vehicle fatality 
statistics, see Kegler et al., supra note 113, at 524–26 (providing death rates for 
Indianapolis (8.2, which was identical to metropolitan area average), Raleigh (9.6), 
Birmingham (15.3), Jacksonville (13.3), Memphis (17.8), Nashville (13.0), Raleigh 
(9.6), and Oklahoma City (11.6)). 
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Thus, a resident of a place with above-average public transit is 
likely to spend less on transportation, create less pollution, get more 
exercise, and be victimized by fewer car crashes than a resident of an 
automobile-dependent area.  It follows that housing in such places 
should be encouraged rather than discouraged. 
Moreover, if more housing should be built in compact urban areas, 
it is precisely the sort of housing targeted in Loughhead—compact, 
large-scale multifamily housing.  As noted above, places with high 
population density tend to have higher transit ridership than places 
with low population density.132  All else being equal, multi-family 
housing is likely to have more people per building than single-family 
housing, which means that neighborhoods with multi-family dwellings 
tend to have higher transit ridership and to drive less than 
neighborhoods dominated by single-family homes.133  Thus, a city that 
wishes to reduce automobile-related pollution should seek to 
encourage (or at least allow) multi-family housing in areas near public 
transit.134  It follows that a state wishing to encourage transit ridership 
should restrict lawsuits designed to exclude multi-family housing from 
existing in compact neighborhoods. 
B. The Public Interest Favors More Rental Housing 
Throughout the United States, there is a rental housing shortage.  
This shortage has been caused by increased demand for rental 
property; the post-2008 economic downturn has meant that fewer 
renters can afford to purchase houses, while tighter credit standards 
have forced would-be homebuyers to rent.135  Moreover, the supply of 
rental housing has not kept up with demand.  Although the number 
of multi-family housing starts in 2013 was higher than it was at the 
start of the economic downturn, it was still less than half the number 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 133. This need not always be the case.  For example, if the multifamily building has 
a huge parking lot that takes up more land than the building itself, it may actually 
have fewer households than a block filled with single-family buildings with small 
driveways. 
 134. Cf. Amanda Siek, Smart Cities: A Detailed Look at Land Use Planning 
Techniques That are Aimed at Promoting Both Energy and Environmental 
Conservation, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 45, 54 (2002) (citing an example of a 
county trying to increase transit ridership by stimulating multifamily housing near 
transit stations during a discussion of transit-oriented zoning). 
 135. See Annie Lowrey, With Rental Demand Soaring, Poor Are Feeling 
Squeezed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/business/
economy/the-poor-are-squeezed-as-rental-housing-demand-soars.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. 
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of multi-family starts in 1985.136  As a result, between 2006 and 2012, 
the supply of multi-family units increased by 1.6 million, while the 
number of renters increased by over 5 million.137  In addition, 1.9 
million rental units were demolished between 2001 and 2011.138  As a 
result of these trends, the national rental vacancy rate (8.3%) is at its 
lowest point since 2000.139 
As a result of this shortage, rents have increased throughout the 
United States.  Between 2000 and 2014, median household income 
has increased by 25.4%, while rent has increased by 52.8%.140  
Nationally, the percentage of renters paying more than 30% of their 
income for housing jumped from 38% in 2000 to 50% in 2010.141  
Twenty-eight percent of renters (including 69% of renters earning 
under $15,000) now pay more than half their incomes in rent.142  The 
explosion in rental costs has not been limited to traditionally high-
cost cities.  For example, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, rents increased 
from 20% of household income in 1979 to 35.2% in 2013.143 
If homeowners are allowed to use nuisance law to limit multi-
family housing, the shortage of rental housing is likely to get worse.  If 
would-be landlords can only build in places far from single-family 
homes, the supply of land available for multi-family housing will 
decrease, the number of new units will decrease, and rents will 
continue to rise even more than would otherwise be the case.  This is 
the case because of the law of supply and demand: if the supply of a 
commodity is limited, and demand is unchanged, people will bid up 
the price for that commodity.144 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 34 (2014), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/
files/sonhr14-color-full.pdf. 
 137. Id. at 25.  However, about three million single-family homes were rented out. 
Id. 
 138. Id. at 25. 
 139. Id. at 22–23. 
 140. See Krishna Rao, The Rent is Too Damn High, ZILLOW REAL EST. RES. (Apr. 
15, 2014), http://www.zillow.com/research/rent-affordability-2013q4-6681. 
 141. See Lowrey, supra note 135. 
 142. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 136, at 5. 
 143. See Rao, supra note 140. 
 144. Cf. Homeowner’s Corp. of River Trails v. Saba, 626 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that where there is “a housing shortage . . . the economic law 
of supply and demand result[s] in unusually high housing prices”); Autumn Corp. v. 
Lederman, 95 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (asserting that the “lack of 
necessary business rental space due to the last war” led to “the exaction of 
exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable rents”). 
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In fact, the logic of Loughhead may limit rental housing even in 
areas far away from single-family housing.  If any increase in 
population means increased traffic, and increased traffic means 
nuisance, then in theory persons other than homeowners might be 
able to assert nuisance claims against builders of new housing.  For 
example, the owner of an office park could argue that nearby housing 
might clog traffic and thus unreasonably interfere with the commutes 
of its employees and customers. 
In sum, the national shortage of rental housing means that now, 
more than ever, a neighborhood’s phobias should not be used to limit 
the supply of such housing. 
C. Zoning Is a Less Harmful Remedy Than Nuisance 
One purpose of zoning is to allow a municipality to create an 
orderly plan of development for the benefit of the entire city, as 
opposed to just one landowner or group of landowners.145  So where a 
city or neighborhood is divided over a proposed land use, the city can 
hold hearings and listen to a variety of perspectives, rather than just 
those of one neighbor. 
By contrast, in a lawsuit the court will primarily hear the 
perspectives of the plaintiff and the defendant, rather than those of 
the community as a whole.  Thus, the court might give undue weight 
to the perspectives of one or two people.  So if nuisance suits become 
more common in disputes relating to multi-family housing, a city’s 
land use map might be determined not by citywide (or even 
neighborhood-wide) give-and-take, but by the most successful 
litigant—thus substituting rule by the angriest litigant for rule by the 
majority of voters.  Even if nuisance suits do not make development 
impossible, they would make new construction burdensome by 
forcing would-be builders to face two hurdles (zoning and a lawsuit) 
where today one hurdle (zoning) is currently the norm.  Thus, courts 
should not allow one or two angry homeowners to use nuisance suits 
to preempt zoning codes and other municipal plans. 
IV.  A PROPOSED RULE 
For the reasons stated above, courts should not treat new infill 
housing as a nuisance.  But what rule should they adopt?  One 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 586 P.2d 860, 866 (Wash. 1978) 
(“[T]he purpose of zoning is not to increase or decrease the value of any Particular 
lot or tract.  Rather it is to benefit the Community generally by the intelligent 
planning of land uses . . . [and to] promote orderly growth and development.”) 
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possible rule might be: “housing should never be a nuisance.”  But 
this rule is overly simplistic, because even though new housing is not 
generally a nuisance, certain features of a building could create a 
nuisance.  For example, a building could have an unusually noisy air 
conditioning system,146 or some other rare feature that harms nearby 
landowners. 
A more precise rule would be that infill housing is not a nuisance 
where the plaintiffs’ arguments are limited to concerns about traffic 
congestion, neighborhood character, or other concerns that have no 
logical stopping point.  Thus, courts should reject nuisance claims 
where the plaintiffs’ major concern is that the housing is denser than 
nearby tracts of land or would allegedly increase congestion by 
bringing additional people into the neighborhood.  This rule would 
apply the public policies in favor of new housing and compact 
development, yet still leave open the possibility that a building or 
subdivision may have unique features that create negative 
externalities.147 
A nuisance plaintiff might argue that, just as many courts balance 
interests in other nuisance cases,148 courts should decide infill-related 
nuisance suits by balancing the disruption caused by new housing 
against the social benefits of new housing.149  However, courts should 
reject this theory for two reasons.  First, in cities with zoning, such 
balancing may already be performed by zoning boards and city 
councils, as well as by judges overhearing appeals from zoning 
decisions.150  Thus, there is no need for judges to duplicate this 
balancing by adjudicating separate nuisance suits.  Second, an 
additional layer of balancing would make the fate of any new 
residential development even more unpredictable, and would thus 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See, e.g., Nair v. Thaw, 242 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1968) (holding that a house’s air 
conditioning system was a nuisance). 
 147. By analogy, I suspect that this rule could reasonably be applied to all nuisance 
arguments that, like concerns over traffic congestion, might be applicable to all new 
housing.  But rather than set out a general rule that might be overbroad, courts or 
legislatures might wish to decide on a case-by-case basis which arguments are 
similarly meritless. 
 148. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 149. Alternatively, a plaintiff might argue that, like the Loughhead court, courts 
should allow nuisance claims in such situations, but grant damages (rather than an 
injunction) against allegedly objectionable residential development. See supra note 
30 and accompanying text.  But even the threat of damages liability might chill infill 
development, and thus reduce infill housing supply—albeit to a lesser extent than 
injunctions which absolutely shut down such projects. 
 150. See supra Part III.C (explaining why nuisance suits should not replicate the 
zoning process). 
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reduce the overall supply of infill housing—which (as explained 
above) would mean that fewer people could live in older 
neighborhoods, which in turn means more people driving more cars, 
more danger to citizens from car crashes, pollution, and greenhouse 
gas emissions, and more expensive housing.  These results are a high 
price to pay for the flexibility of a balancing test. 
CONCLUSION 
The Loughhead plaintiffs argued that a large multi-family building 
in an area dominated by single-family homes was a nuisance, in part 
because the building generates traffic and differs from the other 
buildings in the neighborhood.  This argument, if consistently 
accepted by courts, would mean that any building or subdivision that 
adds a significant amount of housing to a neighborhood is a nuisance, 
because any new residents are likely to generate traffic, and any 
increase in neighborhood population is likely to alter neighborhood 
character in some way. 
If courts frequently use nuisance law to limit infill development, a 
variety of negative results would become more common.  Because 
infill development would be less frequent, developers would have to 
build new housing in greenfield sites, often far from downtowns and 
from public transportation.  As a result, more people would be unable 
to walk or use public transit to jobs and other destinations, causing 
increased vehicle use and spending on vehicles, as well as additional 
obesity, pollution, and deaths and injuries from automobile collisions.  
Moreover, the resulting decrease in new housing construction could 
raise rents and new home prices.  Accordingly, courts should refuse to 
allow nuisance suits against new housing, at least where such suits are 
based on concerns generally applicable to new housing. 
 
